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Notes 
“CAN I GET YOUR DIGITS?”: ILLEGAL 
ACQUISITION OF WIRELESS PHONE NUMBERS 




ABSTRACT—In a SIM-swap attack, a hacker uses text messages sent to a 
wireless customer’s phone number to reset passwords and access critical 
accounts. These SIM-swap attacks are often targeted at cryptocurrency (e.g., 
bitcoin) holders and can result in thousands or even millions of dollars in 
losses. Wireless providers are often the weakest point exploited by hackers 
in SIM-swap attacks. These hacks are even more insidious because they rely 
primarily on social vulnerabilities rather than technical skill: hackers 
pressure accommodating customer service agents or bribe wireless provider 
employees in order to gain control of a wireless providers account and phone 
number. The wireless account and phone number provide a gateway to all 
the wireless customer’s digital accounts through password reset codes sent 
to the victim’s phone number, which is controlled by the hacker. Yet, 
wireless providers have failed to protect this gateway. Experience has shown 
that it is surprisingly too easy for a hacker to gain control of a wireless 
customer’s phone number. This note argues that wireless providers should 
be liable for negligence according to a reasonableness standard of care. Such 
a standard would motivate them to do more to protect wireless customers. 
 
Wireless customers are being harmed by hackers. Wireless providers are 
positioned to prevent that harm by blocking unauthorized control of 
customer phone numbers. This note provides background on the SIM-swap 
attack, addresses policy arguments supporting the liability of wireless 
providers, examines how liability of wireless providers can be found under 
statutory federal law, and argues that common law negligence is the most 
appropriate route to wireless provider liability. The policy-based arguments 
address victims with a pressing need for remedy, wireless providers as the 
least cost avoider, and wireless providers as the most competent avoider. The 
 
 1  J.D. Candidate, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2019. 
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law-based arguments address the roles of the FCC and the FTC in SIM-swap 
attacks and distinguish developments in negligence common law liability for 
general data breaches. In short, this note argues that SIM-swap attacks give 
rise to important harms, wireless providers should be liable for those harms, 
and negligence with a reasonableness standard of care is the right standard 
for liability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Thieves are stealing millions of dollars from wireless customers 
thousands of times each month.2 The mechanism of theft is known as a SIM-
swap attack: a thief gains unauthorized control of a wireless customer’s 
phone number to use SMS-based text messages to reset the wireless 
customer’s passwords and steal valuable assets from critical accounts. This 
note argues that wireless providers can and should do more to prevent these 
types of hacks. 
Frequent massive data breaches of major consumer-facing companies 
have left the population at large wondering about the ways in which they 
have been injured and who is responsible. As such, much attention and 
analysis has been devoted to data breach liability and related issues. This 
note addresses a similar issue, SIM-swap attacks, arising from a similar type 
of event; however, the nature of SIM-swap attacks is fundamentally different 
from data breaches in two key ways. First, SIM-swap attacks are targeted 
attacks on individuals. This contrasts with the large groups affected by most 
data breaches. Second, SIM-swap attacks often result in theft of digital 
assets, such as bitcoin, that have substantial, quantifiable financial value. 
This contrasts with the more difficult to quantify and intangible harms of 
privacy violations and increased risk of identity theft associated with most 
large-scale data breaches. 
These two fundamental differences between SIM-swap attacks and 
more typical data breaches help to frame the discussion in this note and 
highlight the importance of giving SIM-swap attacks special attention. The 
first difference, that fewer people are affected, emphasizes that targeted SIM-
swap attacks will naturally receive less overall attention from law 
enforcement and public regulators.3 When coupled with the second 
difference, that victims are tangibly and substantially harmed, this leads to 
the potential problem that a lesser number of people will suffer a greater 
harm without being able to generate enough interest to facilitate a solution. 
At the same time, these two fundamental differences gravitate towards 
an elegant and attainable solution: place the liability on the party best situated 
to prevent the harm, the wireless provider. Assigning liability to wireless 
providers is an elegant solution because the damages are easy to determine—
 
 2 Nathaniel Popper, Identity Thieves Hijack Cellphone Accounts to Go After Virtual Currency, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/business/dealbook/phone-hack-bitcoin-
virtual-currency.html [https://perma.cc/R9WT-UWPL]. 
 3 However, the number of victims continues to grow, and media attention has increasingly 
highlighted these often devastating hacks. See, e.g., Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, The SIM Hijackers, 
MOTHERBOARD (July 17, 2018, 8:33 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vbqax3/hackers-
sim-swapping-steal-phone-numbers-instagram-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/2BTY-DHM7]. 
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they are simply the cost to be made whole by recovering the stolen digital 
assets—and because the limited number of SIM-swap victims, relative to 
data breaches with millions of victims, protects wireless providers from 
unlimited liability. Wireless providers are also the least cost avoider, as many 
SIM-swap attacks can be traced to weak security practices by the carriers or 
unfaithful employees. 
Wireless customers are being harmed by hackers. Wireless providers 
are positioned to prevent that harm. This note argues that wireless providers 
should be and are liable for failing to prevent unauthorized control of 
wireless customer phone numbers. The discussion proceeds in three main 
parts. Following this introduction, Part II provides background on the 
underlying problem itself, the SIM-swap attack. Part III argues that strong 
policy factors dictate that liability should be assigned to wireless providers. 
Part IV argues that liability may be attached to wireless providers under 
current federal laws, but the common law negligence duty of care is the best 
route for wireless provider liability. Structured in these three parts, this note 
argues that wireless providers should be liable for SIM-swap attacks by 
explaining why SIM-swap attacks are important, why wireless providers 
should be liable, and how liability should be structured. 
II. PROBLEM BACKGROUND 
A. Cybersecurity in a nutshell: what are the keys and who has them? 
Concurrent with locking anything important is the consideration of 
controlling access to the key. From online banking to social media, consumer 
cybersecurity is—in a simplistic sense—no different: digital accounts have 
keys granting access and controlling access to those keys is fundamental to 
account security. Keys distinguish between authorized and unauthorized 
access to digital accounts. Passwords generally serve as these keys. The 
account owner and account provider are theoretically the only ones who have 
the passwords. However, user passwords are an awful mess. 
B. The problems with passwords: passwords are easy to guess and easy to 
forget 
There are two dominant problems with passwords.4 First, user 
passwords are often “weak” or easy to guess.5 Many passwords include 
exclusively or as a part “123,” “123456,” “asdf,” “password,” birthdays, pet 
names (undoubtedly posted on Facebook), or other staggeringly obvious 
 
 4 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, Should the FTC Kill the Password? The Case for Better 
Authentication, 14 PRIVACY & SEC. L. REP. (BNA) 1353, 2–3 (2015). 
 5 Id. at 3–4. 
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features.6 Second, despite being weak or easy to guess, passwords are often 
forgotten.7 Thus, improving the keys securing our information, content, and 
assets must move beyond the password.8 
C. A briefly brilliant solution: two-factor authentication 
Two-factor (or multi-factor) authentication was developed to address 
the two main problems with passwords. Two-factor authentication account 
keys incorporate two elements (or factors): (1) the user password and (2) a 
variable code the user can access.9 Cell phone apps and text messages are 
common sources of the variable code. For text message (or SMS) based two-
factor authentication, the account provider sends the variable code directly 
to the account holder’s cell phone by text message.10 To access her account 
in such a system, the user must enter both her password and a code sent by 
text message.11 These text codes also enable a user to reset her password if 
she forgets it.12 Thus, SMS-based two-factor authentication apparently 
addresses both drawbacks of standalone passwords for user accounts: 
improving security and resetting forgotten passwords. 
D. Vulnerabilities: technical hacking and social hacking 
Unfortunately, this seemingly brilliant solution has a serious 
vulnerability. SMS-based two-factor authentication depends on the user 
controlling her phone number. Although the code delivered by text message 
improves security and aids password reset, a potential hacker can use 
password reset to gain unauthorized account access if the hacker can gain 
control over the user’s phone number. This vulnerability is exploited using 
 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 5–7. 
 9 Id. at 4; Tom Mighell, Protecting Your Online World with Two-Factor Authentication, 41 No. 2 L. 
Prac., 32, 32 (2015); Paul Rice, Civil Liability Theories for Insufficient Security Authentication in Online 
Banking, 10 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 439, 445–47 (2012). 
 10 Mighell, supra note 9, at 32. Cell phone apps, though not primarily addressed herein, provide a 
more secure method where the code is not sent to the account holder. Id. Instead, the account holder has 
an app on her cell phone that generates the code using a cryptographically secure method based on a 
secret seed code that the account provider also has access to. Id. Many services do not support this type 
of security mechanism and instead rely exclusively on SMS-based two-factor authentication. Russell 
Brandom, Two-factor Authentication Is a Mess, VERGE (Jul. 10, 2017, 9:26 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/7/10/15946642/two-factor-authentication-online-security-mess 
[https://perma.cc/9WR4-M7FA]. 
 11 Mighell, supra note 9, at 32. 
 12 Thomas Brewster, All That’s Needed to Hack Gmail And Rob Bitcoin: A Name and a Phone 
Number, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/
2017/09/18/ss7-google-coinbase-bitcoin-hack/#73dde70e41a4 [https://perma.cc/56ZU-GQHN]. 
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two techniques.13 The first technique is a technical approach involving 
vulnerabilities in the SMS system to intercept text messages.14 For this 
technique, hackers exploit weaknesses in an interoperability standard used 
by telecommunications companies, referred to as Signaling System No. 7 
(SS7), to directly intercept messages transmitted using the interoperability 
standard.15 Though a real vulnerability, it requires a high level of 
sophistication to exploit. The second technique is a social approach 
involving vulnerabilities in wireless provider procedures governing phone 
number transfers.16 This technique is known as a SIM-swap attack. Because 
the primary vulnerability is social in nature, the SIM-swap attack is more 
insidious in that it is not a sophisticated attack. Instead, SIM-swap attacks 
require only accommodating customer service agents—or bribable wireless 
provider employees—and persistent, persuasive hackers willing to pressure 
accommodating customer service agents or bribe wireless provider 
employees.17 
E. Anatomy of a SIM-swap attack 
A SIM-swap attack begins with the hacker obtaining the user’s phone 
number, which is often found online with basic research.18 Then the hacker 
calls the wireless provider and asks to transfer the phone number to a new 
 
 13 PAUL A. GRASSI ET AL., NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-63B, DIGITAL IDENTITY GUIDELINES: 
AUTHENTICATION AND LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT, § 8 (2017); Laura Shin, Hackers Have Stolen Millions 
of Dollars in Bitcoin -- Using Only Phone Numbers, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2016, 1:59 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2016/12/20/hackers-have-stolen-millions-of-dollars-in-bitcoin-
using-only-phone-numbers/#689e9f5738ba [https://perma.cc/2ARZ-5HUB]; Russell Brandom, This Is 
Why You Shouldn’t Use Texts for Two-Factor Authentication, VERGE (Sept. 18, 2017, 1:17 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/18/16328172/sms-two-factor-authentication-hack-password-bitcoin 
[https://perma.cc/2MSN-BTM7]; Dan Goodin, Thieves Drain 2fa-protected Bank Accounts by Abusing 
SS7 Routing Protocol, ARS TECHNICA (May 3, 2017, 2:40 PM), https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2017/05/thieves-drain-2fa-protected-bank-accounts-by-abusing-ss7-routing-protocol/ 
[https://perma.cc/VV64-GVNX]; Brewster, supra note 12; Franceschi-Bicchierai, supra note 3; Popper, 
supra note 2. 
 14 GRASSI ET AL., supra note 12, § 8; Brewster, supra note 12; Brandom, supra note 13; Goodin, 
supra note 13. 
 15 Goodin, supra note 13. 
 16 COLLIN MULLINER ET AL., SMS-Based One-Time Passwords: Attacks and Defense, TECH. UNIV. 
OF BERLIN TECH. REPORT 2014-02, 1, 5 (2014); GRASSI ET AL., supra note 12, § 8; Shin, supra note 13. 
 17 Franceschi-Bicchierai, supra note 3. Further developments uncovered by the press exposed the 
common practice of bribing wireless provider employees during a SIM-swap attack to get around a user’s 
account password using an employee’s credentials. See Colin Lecher, Florida Man Arrested in Alleged 
Multi-state SIM Card Hacking Ring, VERGE (Aug. 11, 2018, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/11/17671698/sim-card-fraud-arrest-florida-cyber-fraud 
[https://perma.cc/5Z43-ND7X]. 
 18 Russell Brandom, Anatomy of a Hack, VERGE (Mar. 4, 2015), 
https://www.theverge.com/a/anatomy-of-a-hack [https://perma.cc/RC66-R8NS]. 
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device, such as a cheap cell phone, with a new SIM card.19 Although the 
wireless provider may require some type of password to transfer the phone 
number, the password can be bypassed by the customer service agent.20 Thus, 
a persuasive, angry, or persistent hacker can convince the customer service 
agent to transfer the phone number. Alternatively, some hackers simply bribe 
wireless provider employees to obtain or bypass a user’s account password.21 
As soon as the phone number is transferred to the hacker’s SIM-card, the 
hacker begins resetting passwords on the user’s various digital accounts 
using text message codes.22 Then, account by account, usually starting with 
e-mail, the hacker gains control of the user’s information, content, and 
assets.23 The SIM-swap attack is not technically sophisticated; it only 
requires persuasion, anger, persistence, or some combination thereof—or an 
unscrupulous employee. 
F. The damage done by SIM-swap attacks is large and growing 
SIM-swap hacks have stolen millions of dollars.24 Although replacing 
SMS-based two-factor authentication is likely best in the long term, the 
practical issue is that numerous accounts use SMS-based two-factor 
authentication today. Even more troubling, these SIM-swap attacks are on 
the rise, more than doubling from 2013 to 2016 with over 2,500 such attacks 
being reported in January 2016.25 Indeed, the media has responded to this 
rise by raising the alarm, exemplified in articles by Thomas Brewster, Laura 
Shin, Russell Brandom, and Nathaniel Popper.26 Law enforcement has also 
responded by pursuing some of the perpetrators.27 The damage due to SIM-
swap attacks is rising and the frequency is increasing. And the burden of that 
damage on an individual can be large, with one lawsuit alleging losses of 
$24 million.28 
A better solution may come in the future. But for today, the poor user—
who has $10,000 (or more) of bitcoins stolen, has her Twitter account 
 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Franceschi-Bicchierai, supra note 3. 
 22 Brandom, supra note 18. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Popper, supra note 2. At least two lawsuits have been filed against wireless providers for SIM-
swap attacks. Complaint, Tapang v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00167 (W.D. Wash., Feb. 4, 2018) 
[hereinafter Tapang Complaint]; Complaint, Terpin v. AT&T Inc., No. 2:18-cv-06975 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 
15, 2018) [hereinafter Terpin Complaint]. 
 25 Popper, supra note 2. 
 26 Brandom, supra note 13; Brewster, supra note 12; Popper, supra note 2; Shin, supra note 13. 
 27 Lecher, supra note 17. 
 28 Terpin Complaint, supra note 24, ¶ 108. 
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controlled by a gloating fifteen-year-old hacker, and has lost all the personal 
information in her e-mail to the same fifteen-year-old—is left thinking, 
“Why did my wireless provider transfer my phone number to this hacker?” 
The keys to digital accounts, containing personal information, content, and 
assets, are accessible via phone numbers. Thus, phone numbers have become 
in themselves the digital keys to the kingdom that unlock access to users’ 
digital and real lives. Wireless providers should not be free to give users’ 
keys away. 
III. POLICY-BASED ARGUMENTS: WIRELESS PROVIDERS 
SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR UNAUTHORIZED ACCOUNT ACCESS 
AND SIM-SWAP ATTACKS BECAUSE WIRELESS PROVIDERS ARE 
BOTH THE LEAST COST AVOIDER AND THE MOST COMPETENT 
AVOIDER 
A. Liability should be assigned because damages and causation 
demonstrate a pressing need 
The injury to the wireless customer in a SIM-swap attack is substantial. 
Further, the causal link is clearer for SIM-swap attacks than for general data 
breaches. Unlike general data breaches, where injury to the customer is not 
immediate and causation is difficult to find, SIM-swap attacks cause tangible 
injury to the wireless customer and causation is easy to find. This section 
justifies the need to assign liability by presenting the substantial injuries 
suffered by the wireless customer and the causal link to the SIM-swap 
attack.29 
As in data breaches, SIM-swap attacks can create several types of 
victims. However, unlike in data breaches, the customer is harmed much 
more by the SIM-swap attack than the company. The wireless provider may 
cease receiving customer account payments due to a SIM-swap attack. In 
contrast, the wireless customer loses control of her phone number, access to 
multiple digital accounts, and thousands or even millions of dollars.30 Thus, 
unlike major data breaches of personal information or credit card information 
seen in heavily publicized breaches at, e.g., Yahoo!, Target, Home Depot, 
and Equifax, individually targeted SIM-swap attacks place a much greater 
share of the injury on the individual wireless customer. 
 
 29 This section focuses on identifying the party most competent to prevent SIM-swap attacks. Thus, 
the individual account providers for each account breached using the compromised wireless phone 
number, such as Gmail or Dropbox, for example, are largely ignored because these accounts are not the 
route of the SIM-swap attack. The role and liability of the individual account providers is a critical issue 
that deserves much discussion, but for this note, the individual account providers are the ends and not the 
means of SIM-swap attacks. 
 30 See, e.g., Brandom, supra note 18; see also Terpin Complaint, supra note 24, ¶ 108. 
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In contrast to general data breaches, the large individual injuries of 
SIM-swap attacks present more cognizable injuries that legal decision 
makers cannot ignore. In SIM-swap attacks, wireless providers are generally 
not exposed to the substantial costs associated with major breaches. Instead, 
the attack is focused on a single customer of the wireless provider. Thus, the 
apparent cost to the wireless provider is the potential loss of a single 
customer.31 Contrast that to the SIM-swap victim where the phone number is 
used to reset passwords of the victim’s digital accounts in order to gain 
control of the victim’s e-mail, social media, online banking accounts, 
financial transaction accounts (e.g., PayPal and Venmo), utilities, cloud 
storage, and cryptocurrencies.32 When a thief gains control of each account 
on this list, there are two types of harm: massive privacy invasion and direct 
financial harm. 
In the privacy category, control of many or all digital accounts goes 
beyond the increased risk of identity theft. In these scenarios a hacker has 
access to every e-mail the victim has written, every post and private message 
on social media, every file and picture backed up in the cloud, and even every 
text message backed up in the cloud.33 As a worst-case scenario, the hacker 
could have access to transcripts of past relationships, medical records and 
diagnosis, records of every mistake the victim made, and inappropriate or 
scandalous pictures, video, or behaviors.34 Although often ignored by legal 
decision makers as intangible, these are deep privacy violations with the 
potential to ruin lives.35 
 
 31 Contrast this with major data breaches that incur multiple costs including notifying the victims, 
obtaining thorough breach analysis, replacing compromised equipment and systems, increased regulatory 
compliance, fraud monitoring services for affected customers, and covering fraudulent charges in certain 
circumstances. Michael D. Simpson, All Your Data Are Belong to Us: Consumer Data Breach Rights and 
Remedies in an Electronic Exchange Economy, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 669, 682–83 (2016). For example, 
in a credit card information breach, the credit card issuer may spend heavily replacing stolen cards and 
crediting fraudulent charges. Another potential major cost of breach is the loss of public confidence 
causing decreases in business and public investment. Id. In the aggregate, these various costs to the 
breached business are substantial. 
 32 See supra Section II.E and II.F. Compare SIM-swap victim injuries with the costs for victims of 
general data breach, which are more speculative. Simpson, supra note 31, at 684–85. Costs to the 
customer might be increased threat of identity theft and time spent dealing with actual identity theft, 
fraudulent charges that are not always refunded by the financial institution, identity theft monitoring costs, 
or privacy intrusions that, though personally damaging, are not financial in nature. Id. The cost to the 
breached business is often considered to be large while the individual injuries are often considered to be 
small. This concept, justified or not, is likely one reason courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies have 
not provided a clear path for individual redress following a major data breach. See infra Section IV.A. 
 33 Brandom, supra note 18; Popper, supra note 2. 
 34 See, e.g., Adrianne Jeffries, Photos Hurt, VERGE (Sept. 3, 2014, 5:26 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2014/9/3/6103265/photos-hurt [https://perma.cc/G8AS-ZG5E]. 
 35 See Simpson, supra note 31, at 685–86. See also discussion infra in Section IV.B. 
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In the direct financial harm category, thefts from cryptocurrency 
accounts holding, e.g., Bitcoin or Ethereum present very appealing targets 
for SIM-swap attacks that translate into concrete and cognizable harm.36 A 
cryptocurrency holder might take security seriously, enabling two-factor 
authentication and requiring multistep authorization through more than one 
e-mail account to transfer cryptocurrency from an account. However, 
because the hacker uses the SIM-swap attack to gain control of the phone 
number for two-factor password resets of even multiple e-mail accounts and 
the online cryptocurrency account, the cryptocurrency holder’s extra security 
efforts are bypassed at the wireless provider through social hacking.37 
Cryptocurrency account holders may have substantial funds in these 
accounts, ranging into the millions of dollars.38 
Cryptocurrency thefts present the type of tangible injury that legal 
decision makers should not ignore.39 The cryptocurrency market 
capitalization is currently more than $200 billion.40 A popular U.S. 
cryptocurrency exchange and account provider has over twenty million 
accounts and has transferred more than $150 billion in cryptocurrency 
assets.41 SIM-swap attacks expose victims to theft of cryptocurrency with 
real, tangible, and substantial value. Making these victims whole requires 
replacing the stolen property, i.e., replacing the cryptocurrency assets.42 
Further, problems with causation that plague general data breach 
negligence liability are not present with SIM-swap attacks. In negligence for 
data breach cases, courts have had trouble identifying harm and, especially, 
finding causation for such harm because the causal link between a user’s 
 
 36 See supra Section II.F. The risk of unauthorized access to online banking accounts and financial 
transaction accounts is also significant, but it is laid aside in this discussion because it has already been 
given substantial attention in the form of scholarship, legislative action, and banking procedures. Such 
substantial attention has translated into a higher likelihood of reimbursement for fraudulent charges. 
Further, the more mature and regulated banking industry produces a more robust financial paper trail that 
may give thieves pause. 
 37 See supra Section II.D and II.E. 
 38 There are multiple ways to hold cryptocurrency funds and online accounts are not required (which 
would limit the risk of theft of those funds via SIM-swap attack), but transferring and exchanging the 
funds is often done (in substantial volume) through online accounts with cryptocurrency exchanges. Thus, 
the danger of online account hacking is difficult to bypass. 
 39 In a sense, the different legal decision makers have punted on individual victim injuries for general 
data breaches. By focusing on the lack of physical injury in typical data breaches, the victim is often 
prevented from seeking redress from liable parties. See discussion infra in Section IV.B. 
 40 COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
4JDX-6FZS]. 
 41 COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2018) [https://perma.cc/H3Q5-PLS8]. 
 42 The hackers themselves are also liable for the illegal activity and theft; however, as in real theft, 
the thieves are often judgement-proof in civil court and the funds are never recovered from the thief even 
when the thief is caught. Simpson, supra note 31, at 685 n.108. 
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information being released in a data breach and that user’s later identity theft 
or account hacking is very difficult to establish.43 In contrast, a SIM-swap 
attack includes close temporal causation because the transfer of control over 
the phone number is immediately followed by password reset using that 
phone number and unauthorized access to other accounts, including 
cryptocurrency accounts where theft establishes clear damages.44 Account 
password resets will generate evidence illustrating use of the illegally 
controlled phone number to reset account passwords, demonstrating the 
causal link. Thus, SIM-swap attacks include strong causal links to tangible 
cryptocurrency theft, which provides a straightforward assignment of 
liability for damages. 
B. Wireless providers should be liable for SIM-swap attacks because 
wireless providers are the least cost avoider 
Wireless providers are the least cost avoider in SIM-swap attacks. They 
are the gatekeepers controlling customer phone numbers, while customers 
have little ability to prevent SIM-swap attacks without wireless provider 
assistance. The cost would be minor for wireless providers to implement 
reasonable customer verification protocols before transferring phone 
numbers. 
To assign liability for SIM-swap attacks, the costs of prevention for 
wireless providers must be weighed against the costs of prevention for 
wireless customers. Economic theory provides insight into the value of this 
weighing, instructing liability to be placed “on the party to a transaction who 
is the one that can fix the ‘problem’ while incurring the least cost.”45 In other 
words, put the cost on the least cost avoider.46 In a market without failures or 
transaction costs, wireless providers and customers would agree to a price 
for better security.47 However, because transaction costs cause issues such as 
information asymmetry and collective action problems, economic theory 
suggests placing liability on the least cost avoider.48 
Identifying the least cost avoider involves, in a heavily abbreviated 
analysis, identifying an initial rough guess and applying three guidelines to 
 
 43 See infra Section IV.B. 
 44 Brandom, supra note 18; Popper, supra note 2. 
 45 Paul Rosenzweig, Cybersecurity and the Least Cost Avoider, DAYZERO: CYBERSECURITY LAW 
AND POLICY (Nov. 5, 2013, 11:41 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/cybersecurity-and-least-cost-avoider 
[https://perma.cc/W7R2-MS6P]; see also R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 56 J.L. & ECON. 837 
(2013). 
 46 Coase, supra note 45. 
 47 See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of Software Security, 
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 313–14 (2006); Rosenzweig, supra note 45. 
 48 See, e.g., Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 47, at 314–19; Rosenzweig, supra note 45. 
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refine and improve the selection.49 The rough guess rules out cost bearers 
that “would obviously [convey] too great an expense” to reduce the targeted 
harm.50 For example, accidents involving pedestrians likely could be sharply 
reduced if pedestrianism itself were substantially modified and limited, but 
the cost is likely too great because pedestrianism is “without ready 
substitution.”51 In other words, the cost should not be allocated such that a 
beneficial and valuable activity is essentially quenched. 
With the rough guess made, three guidelines help clarify the least cost 
avoider.52 The first guideline warns against expensive administrative costs.53 
If the cost to determine the least cost avoider is high, it may be better to 
assign an alternative cost avoider that is cheaper to identify even though the 
alternative cost avoider is more expensive.54 The second guideline instructs 
that externalization of costs should be avoided.55 One type of externalization 
that occurs is “due to inadequate knowledge,” where a party that might be 
able to reduce the harmful activity lacks adequate knowledge to foresee and 
reduce the risk.56 The third guideline suggests that costs should be placed on 
the party best able to transact or “bribe” others to reduce the harm.57 This 
strategy encourages the market to correct allocation errors through use of the 
party with the cheapest transaction costs, i.e., the best briber.58 These criteria 
guide the least cost avoider analysis for SIM-swap attacks. 
SIM-swap attack avoidance costs intuitively weigh in favor of 
assigning the wireless provider as the least cost avoider as an initial rough 
guess.59 Particular to SIM-swap attacks, the victims can do very little to avoid 
attacks without wireless provider assistance. Thus, the cost of avoiding SIM-
swap attacks, if placed on victims, is likely a sharp reduction in use of digital 
accounts and assets that have value. But that implies too great a cost, just as 
quenching pedestrianism implies too great a cost, because digital accounts 
and assets are arguably of great economic benefit to society.60 The customer 
can limit the potential injury by aggressively using other authentication 
 
 49 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 140–152 
(Yale Univ. Press 2008) (1970). 
 50 Id. at 140–41. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 143–52. 
 53 Id. at 143–44. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 144–45. 
 56 Id. at 148–49. 
 57 Id. at 150–52. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 140–41. 
 60 Id. 
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forms and avoiding SMS-based two-factor authentication. However, such 
steps are not always possible because many accounts only provide SMS-
based two-factor authentication, and some require it.61 Thus, unlike cases of 
consumer phishing, where the likelihood of injuries can be reduced by 
consumer carefulness, SIM-swap attacks are almost impossible to avoid by 
consumer vigilance, and the harm could only be diminished by avoiding 
beneficial activity altogether.62 As a further distinction over phishing scams, 
which have been heavily publicized, SIM-swap victims suffer from lack of 
adequate knowledge. These victims lack knowledge of their vulnerability, 
because SIM-swap attacks are still underpublicized, as well as the know-how 
to adequately address their vulnerability.63 That inadequate knowledge leads 
to externalization of the costs64 in opposition to the second guideline.65 Thus, 
the cost on each customer to avoid SIM-swap attacks is high and weighs 
against assigning liability. 
On the other hand, the costs for the wireless provider of avoiding SIM-
swap attacks are very reasonable, especially when divided across all 
customers served. The intuitive rough guess, the first guideline, and the third 
guideline all weigh in favor of wireless providers as the least cost avoider.66 
Specifically, wireless providers could increase the standards for 
authenticating access by requiring and enforcing account passwords other 
than the last four numbers of user Social Security Numbers, and this could 
be done without diminishing the overall usage of wireless services which 
would come at too great a cost to society.67 Administratively—in accord with 
 
 61 This point is also a key distinction from cases refusing to identify service providers as the least 
cost avoider. See Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 952–57 (7th Cir. 1982) (dismissing 
plaintiffs’ negligence claim because plaintiff “showed a lack of prudence throughout” and the liability 
should be assigned to the party best “able to avert the consequence at least cost,” which in this case did 
not immunize the plaintiff, as the customer, from liability because the court was able to identify multiple 
ways the plaintiff could have avoided the harm with prudent conduct). Unlike in Evra Corp., where 
plaintiff could have avoided the harm with ordinary prudence, SIM-swap victims are powerless to avoid 
the harm of SIM-swap attacks without the wireless providers’ assistance. Id. 
 62 Jeremy Feigelson & Camille Calman, Liability for the Costs of Phishing and Information Theft, 
13 J. INTERNET L. 1, 19–20 (2010). 
 63 That said, media attention has been increasing and at least one high-profile lawsuit has been filed. 
See supra Section II.F noting articles covering SIM-swap attacks and the Terpin Complaint. 
 64 The parties that will bear these externalized costs are likely the public, through deprivation of 
beneficial digital technology usage and advances, and the companies attempting to provide and maintain 
these digital accounts and assets, which will lose users who cannot prevent theft/breach. 
 65 CALABRESI, supra note 49, at 144, 148–49. 
 66 Id. at 140–53. 
 67 Id. at 140–43. It appears that most carriers provide some option for increased security, but the level 
of compliance with the additional account security is unclear. See, e.g., Lorrie Cranor, Your Mobile Phone 
Account Could be Hijacked by an Identity Thief, TECH@FTC (Jun. 7, 2016, 11:38 AM), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/techftc/2016/06/your-mobile-phone-account-could-be-hijacked-
identity-thief [https://perma.cc/7XMM-VUCY]. 
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the first guideline—it is cheaper to determine if the small number of wireless 
providers are implementing reasonable security for account access than to 
investigate every other point in the chain that may or may not be related to 
enabling SIM-swap attacks.68 Requiring different passwords may involve 
additional training and infrastructure modification, but the fundamental 
process of phone number porting would remain unchanged as different 
passwords can be directly integrated with current systems. Further, if 
wireless providers are not the least cost avoider, they are nonetheless “the 
best briber” because they do not face coercion and collective action problems 
and they transact cheaply with customers due to their sophisticated business 
infrastructure.69 Thus, the cost to wireless providers of requiring different 
passwords is small, especially when divided across all customers, and can be 
cheaply shifted in part to others. 
Requiring different passwords and enforcing the password requirement 
without easy bypass by customer service will aggressively limit the 
effectiveness of SIM-swap attacks. The great threat of the SIM-swap attack 
is that it is social in nature and thus not technically complex. As such, simply 
requiring a real password will eliminate the social nature of the hack.70 Thus, 
a low-cost measure of requiring real passwords to transfer a wireless 
customer’s phone number, which effectively functions as the key to her 
digital life, will greatly limit the danger of SIM-swap attacks. Such a low-
cost solution to avoid the millions of dollars in injuries harming wireless 
customers strongly indicates that wireless providers are the least cost 
avoider. With this low-cost solution in reach, economic theory—and 
intuition—place liability for SIM-swap attacks on wireless providers. 
 
 68 CALABRESI, supra note 49, at 143–44. 
 69 Id. at 150–52. Indeed, wireless providers likely have monopoly or near monopoly power such that 
the cost of avoidance measures for SIM-swap attacks can quickly be distributed to wireless customers 
with minimal transaction costs, whereas direct assignment to wireless customers would accomplish little 
harm reduction. 
 70 Although additional issues may arise with forgotten passwords and weak passwords, as discussed 
in Section II, requiring any password is still an improvement. More recent evidence has shown that 
wireless provider employee bribery is also a vulnerability. Lecher, supra note 17. Ultimately, the exact 
solution is to require wireless providers to implement reasonable standards of security according to a 
reasonable standard of care, as argued below in Section IV. Such a determination will require some 
examination of the facts, but it will also lend itself to a reasonable and intelligent standard that can shift 
over time with changes in cybersecurity threats and technology. A reasonableness standard will also force 
wireless providers to secure their own systems and employees, which the wireless customer has no ability 
to control. 
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C. Wireless providers should be liable for SIM-swap attacks because 
wireless providers are the most competent avoider 
Not only are wireless providers the least cost avoiders, they are also the 
most competent avoider. As gatekeepers, administrators, builders, and 
providers of wireless networks, wireless providers are best situated to 
understand the vulnerabilities of their own network, especially with rapid 
technological change, and to control the actions of their employees. In 
contrast, other relevant parties are unlikely to provide adequately competent 
and responsive solutions. 
Technology is rapidly changing, leading to new opportunities and 
benefits on the one hand but also to new risks and dangers on the other. 
Because of the rapidly changing and increasingly complex nature of 
technology, few people are adequately knowledgeable and competent to 
address the risks. The average consumer is likely neither able nor competent 
enough to prevent SIM-swap attacks because there is little the consumer can 
do and there are few consumers who understand, or are even aware of, the 
vulnerabilities.71 Just as product liability places liability on manufacturers for 
defects because products are too complex for consumers to adequately 
understand the threat of defects, cybersecurity negligence must place the 
liability on wireless providers for SIM-swaps because cybersecurity has 
become too complex for consumers to adequately understand the threat of 
vulnerabilities.72 
Further, legislatures still lack the competence to adequately address 
rapidly developing vulnerabilities. Legislatures may pass legislation that 
places liability directly on the wireless providers as the most competent 
avoiders. Going further than that to create complex reactionary legislation 
that addresses each problem as it comes will recreate the current problem. 
Right now, there is specific legislation governing cybersecurity standards for 
certain industries, e.g., banking and healthcare, but these are not the only 
places where cybersecurity is an issue.73 Rather, SIM-swap attacks on 
 
 71 This parallels the inadequate knowledge externalization of the second guideline in the least cost 
avoider analysis in Section III.B. CALABRESI, supra note 49, at 148–49. Thus, placing the burden on 
consumers would run afoul of the second guideline because consumers generally lack adequate 
knowledge to prevent the harm. This section focuses on competence for an intuitive argument while 
Section III.B focuses on externalities for an economic argument, but both arguments center on the simple 
proposition that consumers are just not competent enough to bear the burden of ensuring cybersecurity. 
 72 Jeffrey W. Kemp & Lindsy Nicole Alleman, The Bulk Supplier, Sophisticated User, and Learned 
Intermediary Doctrines Since the Adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 26 REV. LITIG. 927, 928 
(2007). 
 73 Indeed, targeted regulation and liability for cybersecurity practices have been discussed in detail 
in other contexts. See, e.g., David L. Silverman, Developments in Data Security Breach Liability, 70 BUS. 
LAW. 231 (2015); Simpson, supra note 31; Feigelson & Calman, supra note 62; Hahn & Layne-Farrar, 
supra note 47; Ritu Singh, Two-Factor Authentication: A Solution to Times Past or Present? The Debate 
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wireless providers pose even greater threats in some cases. Comprehensive 
legislation from a legislature marginally more competent than consumers to 
address rapidly developing cybersecurity threats in the wireless and internet 
industries will only continue the cycle of delayed responses following 
significant harms.74 The legislature is neither responsive nor competent 
enough to properly respond to these threats. 
Finally, though much more technically competent, administrative 
agencies such as the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) still have insufficient responsive 
competence to adequately address rapidly developing vulnerabilities. The 
FTC and the FCC can bring about industry-wide progress towards improved 
standards for consumer privacy and data security, but these agencies also 
respond slowly to significant consumer injury.75 Both the FTC and the FCC 
lack the responsive competence to rapidly adjust to developments in 
cybersecurity threatening the wireless and internet industries. Thus, the FTC 
and the FCC can help bring about progress, but that does not justify shielding 
the most competent avoiders, wireless providers, from liability for SIM-swap 
attacks. 
Thus, wireless providers are the most competent party to understand the 
vulnerabilities of their own network and avoid SIM-swap attacks, and the 
other relevant parties are insufficiently competent or unresponsive. 
 
Surrounding the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Security Safeguards Rule and the Methods of Risk Assessment and 
Compliance, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 761 (2006). Examples of targeted legislation include 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Controlling 
the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (ECPA), the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, and the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act. See, e.g., 
45 C.F.R. Part 164 (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713 (2012); 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 6801–6809 (2012). The ECPA may be relevant to SIM-swap attack victims in that it may impart 
statutory liability on wireless providers, but that additional analysis is beyond the scope of this note. 
 74 For an argument that “legislation has fallen short in mitigating the threat of cyber-attacks,” see 
Christine Lino, Cybersecurity in the Federal Government: Failing to Maintain a Secure Cyber 
Infrastructure, 41 BULL. ASS’N FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 24, 25–26 (2014) (noting specifically the Senate’s 
failure to pass the Cybersecurity Act of 2012). 
 75 See discussion infra Section IV.A. The FTC has recognized the threat of SIM-swap attacks and 
the FCC has addressed the threat of “pretexting” (i.e., fraudulent impersonation of an account owner to 
achieve unauthorized account access), but both agencies have failed to place distinct liability on the 
wireless providers or provide recourse for harmed victims. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 64.2010 (2018). 
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IV. LAW-BASED ARGUMENTS: WIRELESS PROVIDERS ARE 
LIABLE FOR UNAUTHORIZED ACCOUNT ACCESS AND SIM-SWAP 
ATTACKS UNDER EXISTING FEDERAL REGULATION AND TORT 
COMMON LAW, BUT TORT COMMON LAW PROVIDES THE MOST 
ELEGANT SOLUTION 
A. Federal law, administrated by both the FCC and the FTC, assigns 
liability to wireless providers, but uncertainty and delayed enforcement 
harms consumers 
Liability for SIM-swap attacks should attach to wireless providers 
under existing federal law, but the liability is accompanied with uncertainty 
and delayed enforcement to the point that SIM-swap victims may be left out 
in the cold. The FCC and the FTC both exert influence over wireless 
providers in the context of data privacy and security. The FCC regulates 
everything under the telecommunications umbrella, which includes wireless 
providers.76 The FTC has taken the lead to enforce minimum standards of 
data privacy and security for consumer protection.77 Thus, wireless providers 
should be answerable to both the FCC and the FTC for SIM-swap attacks, 
but reality is far more uncertain.78 Wireless providers likely will continue to 
fly between the large cracks created by FCC and FTC policy. 
1. In its role regulating wireless providers and phone numbers, the 
FCC should ensure proper assignment of liability for SIM-swap 
attacks, but such liability is uncertain in reality 
Under its governing laws, the FCC should assign and enforce wireless 
provider liability for SIM-swap attacks. However, the FCC’s actions and 
position remain uncertain. Two primary factors support the claim that the 
FCC should ensure proper liability assignment for unauthorized number 
ports, i.e., SIM-swap attacks. First, the FCC’s rules on wireless local number 
portability (WLNP), established under the authority of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, require the mechanism that enables SIM-
swap attacks: number porting.79 However, the regulations governing WLNP 
are silent about authorization.80 Second, the Telecommunications Act of 
 
 76 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (“For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in 
communication by wire and radio . . . there is created a commission to be known as the ‘Federal 
Communications Commission,’. . . .”). 
 77 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
 78 See, e.g., Silverman, supra note 73; Simpson, supra note 31; Feigelson & Calman, supra note 62; 
Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 47. 
 79 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2) (2012); 47 C.F.R. § 52.31 (2018); see also FED. COMMUNICATIONS 
COMM’N, Wireless Local Number Portability, May 18, 2016, https://www.fcc.gov/general/wireless-local-
number-portability-wlnp [https://perma.cc/K7S9-932B]. 
 80 47 C.F.R. § 52.31 (2018). 
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1996 requires telecommunications providers, including wireless providers, 
to protect proprietary customer information.81 Thus, the FCC has both 
mandated the process giving rise to SIM-swap attacks, while ignoring the 
risk created, and has responsibility for ensuring protection of customer 
information. Unfortunately, the FCC’s clear responsibility and role for 
resolving SIM-swap attacks is muddied by uncertainty arising from the 
FCC’s slow responsiveness and inconsistent focus. 
The Telecommunications Act provided several protections to wireless 
customers that should provide protection for SIM-swap attacks. Specifically, 
if a wireless provider fails to protect the confidentiality of customer 
proprietary information, the FCC can levy charges and penalties.82 Even 
more relevant to the SIM-swap victim, the customer can sue for the full 
amount of damages—including reasonable attorney’s fees—sustained by a 
customer information violation.83 Such a private right of action against 
wireless providers certainly would and should provide wireless customers 
harmed by SIM-swap attacks with proper protection and recourse for 
unauthorized account access.84 Unauthorized control of a customer’s account 
and phone number surely must be an unauthorized disclosure of customer 
proprietary information under the statute.85 The statute defines Customer 
Proprietary Network Information (CPNI) as “information that relates to the 
quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, location, and amount of 
use of a telecommunications service . . . “ and “information contained in the 
bills. . . .”86 Although the statute targets account usage information, 
excluding coverage over control and access of an entire account while 
protecting things like “information contained in the bills” is the equivalent 
 
 81 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as 47 U.S.C. 
§ 222 (2012)); 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2012). Other laws make unauthorized account access illegal, but do not 
address wireless provider duties. Wireless Telephone Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–172, 112 
Stat. 53 (1998) (primarily amending 18 U.S.C. § 1029). See also FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, Cell 
Phone Fraud, Sept. 8, 2017, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/cell-phone-fraud [https://perma.cc/
EHY5-U9BK]. 
 82 47 U.S.C. § 205 (2012). 
 83 Id. §§ 206–07. 
 84 The scope of these privacy protections afforded by the FCC under 47 U.S.C. § 222 was expanded 
by FCC regulations to cover internet service providers (ISPs), but those regulations were repealed 
recently. Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services, 81 
Fed. Reg. 87274 (Dec. 2, 2016) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64), repealed by Act of Apr. 3, 2017, Pub. 
L. No. 115-22, 131 Stat. 88 (codifying a joint resolution disapproving of the FCC’s broadband customer 
privacy rules). See Paul R. Gaus, Only the Good Regulations Die Young: Recognizing the Consumer 
Benefits of the FCC’s Now-Defunct Privacy Regulations, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 713 (2017). 
 85 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012). 
 86 Id. § 222(h)(1). Note that CPNI excludes “subscriber list information,” which includes telephone 
numbers. Yet, the telephone number itself is not the problem in a SIM-swap attack; unauthorized control 
of the entire account and the telephone is the problem. 
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of locking the window while leaving the door wide open.87 Even reading the 
statute in the most literal sense, handing over complete control of the account 
certainly exposes even the most narrowly defined CPNI to the unauthorized 
hacker. Thus, the Telecommunications Act directly provides for wireless 
provider liability in the case of SIM-swap attacks. 
Unfortunately, wireless provider liability only becomes more uncertain 
by looking to FCC guidance and case law. The privacy protections required 
by 47 U.S.C. § 222 focus on information disclosure as opposed to reasonable 
security measures.88 As such, there is no guidance on what security measures 
are necessary to fulfill the “duty to protect the confidentiality of proprietary 
information of . . . customers.”89 Further, the FCC has not issued any 
guidance on reasonable data security nor undertaken any enforcement 
actions, and the case law surrounding the issue is only tangentially relevant. 
Although the FCC may ultimately address the issues, the case law 
illustrates the FCC’s inability to respond quickly to address customer harms. 
The initial implementation of WLNP took years to resolve in the courts, but 
the FCC eventually won.90 Further drawn-out battles were fought over how 
customer information could be used during wireless number ports, but the 
FCC eventually won.91 Still more drawn-out battles were fought over the type 
of customer approval required for wireless providers to disclose customer 
proprietary information, but the FCC eventually won.92 
The most relevant case law addresses the private right of action under 
47 U.S.C. § 206 for violations of 47 U.S.C. § 222, but such actions are 
sparse. Weinstein v. AT&T Mobility LLC examines the extent an undirected 
employee’s actions in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 222 subject the wireless 
provider to liability.93 In Weinstein, the plaintiff sued AT&T under 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 206 and 222 because an AT&T employee used her position to access 
information about the plaintiff and send messages regarding the plaintiff’s 
relationships to the plaintiff’s contacts.94 The court held that employees 
 
 87 Id. § 222(h)(1)(B). 
 88 Id. § 222. 
 89 Id. § 222(a). 
 90 See, e.g., Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Ass’n v. F.C.C., 330 F.3d 502, 504 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (ending delays to the rollout of WLNP). 
 91 See, e.g., Verizon California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 555 F.3d 270, 272–75 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (upholding 
the FCC’s order based on customer privacy in 47 U.S.C. § 222 and prohibiting Verizon from using 
customer proprietary information received from a competitor for marketing purposes before completing 
the number transfer to the competitor’s network). 
 92 See, e.g., National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. F.C.C., 555 F.3d 996, 997, 999–1002 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (upholding the FCC’s order based on 47 U.S.C. § 222 requiring wireless providers to 
obtain opt-in consent before disclosing customer proprietary information). 
 93 553 F. Supp. 2d 637, 639–41 (W.D. Va. 2008). 
 94 Id. at 638–39. 
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acting outside their scope of employment do not subject the wireless provider 
to liability under 47 U.S.C. § 222.95 The court also held that the wireless 
provider was not liable because no recoverable damages were specified in 
the absence of any “injury to [the plaintiff’s] person, property, health, or 
reputation.”96 
Thus, Weinstein is an example of an unsuccessful suit under 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 206 and 222, but SIM-swap attacks are easily distinguishable. First, 
unlike the employee in Weinstein, wireless provider employees who transfer 
phone numbers are acting within the scope of employment.97 Second, unlike 
in Weinstein, cryptocurrency theft in a SIM-swap attack provides concrete 
and cognizable injury to a customer’s property.98 
When viewing the statute and case law holistically, the 
Telecommunications Act does provide SIM-swap victims a path to obtain 
recourse from wireless providers, but there is little clarity on the standards 
courts will apply to wireless providers. Suits under 47 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 222 
do not appear to have been successfully brought, but SIM-swap attacks are 
easily distinguished from the failed suits. The FCC has not published an 
order setting a standard for privacy, and generally is slow to do so and even 
slower to enforce it—especially considering the drawn-out court battles that 
inevitably follow.99 If the FCC does take up the issue, SIM-swap victims are 
likely to be better protected in the long term, but the FCC’s history indicates 
that SIM-swap victims who have already been harmed, or are currently being 
harmed, will receive little recompense. These multiple factors combine to 
form the conclusion that the Telecommunications Act does assign liability 
for SIM-swap attacks to wireless providers, but significant uncertainty 
caused by the slow responsiveness of the FCC provides little assurance that 
a suit against a wireless provider will be successful. 
 
 95 Id. at 640–41. 
 96 Id. at 640. 
 97 Id. However, in cases where customer account passwords are disclosed or bypassed by bribed 
wireless provider employees, the argument for wireless provider liability under 47 U.S.C. § 222 may be 
weakened by the holding in Weinstein. That is, Weinstein might be interpreted to hold that wireless 
providers are not liable under 47 U.S.C. § 222 for SIM-swap attacks enabled by unscrupulous, undirected 
employees. 
 98 Id. at 640–41. 
 99 The closest thing appears to be regulation in 47 C.F.R. § 64.2010 prohibiting unauthorized access 
to customer proprietary network information and requiring adequate customer authentication steps. 
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2. In its role as the default data security and privacy regulator, the 
FTC should enforce prevention of SIM-swap attacks, but SIM-
swap victims will receive little recourse 
The FTC has become the leading agency in regulating data security and 
privacy, and thus should enforce measures to prevent SIM-swap attacks.100 
However, two significant issues exist that limit the wisdom of relying on the 
FTC to solve SIM-swap attacks. First, FTC action against wireless providers 
may be limited because wireless providers provide common carrier 
services.101 Second, FTC action against wireless providers may cause change 
to wireless industry standards for security, but it would not provide any direct 
mechanism for SIM-swap victims to recover damages. 
The rise in the FTC’s authority over data privacy and security is due to 
the absence of another agency in this role and a broad reading of the FTC’s 
power to prevent “deceptive” or “unfair” activities under section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).102 The FTC has taken the initiative 
to bring two kinds of enforcement actions against companies with poor data 
security and privacy procedures: actions based on the first prong of 
deceptiveness and actions based on the second prong of unfairness.103 
Under the deceptiveness prong, the FTC has brought actions against 
entities for failing to abide by their own data privacy and security policies.104 
In such cases, the FTC asserted that luring in consumers with promises of 
privacy and security is deceptive when the entity fails to act as promised.105 
These actions have generally been successful.106 However, the deceptiveness 
prong requires that the misbehaving entity make promises and then fail to 
deliver.107 Thus, the deceptiveness prong is inapplicable for entities 
promising no or only dismal data privacy and security.108 
Due to the limitations of the deceptiveness prong, the FTC has 
subsequently brought actions under the unfairness prong against entities with 
either no data privacy and security policy or a poor one.109 These actions 
 
 100 Stuart L. Pardau & Blake Edwards, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Privacy by Design: 
New Legal Frontiers in Cybersecurity, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 227, 239–44 (2017). 
 101 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 598–99 (2014). 
 102 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). 
 103 Pardau & Edwards, supra note 100, at 233–35; Simpson, supra note 31, at 692–96. Note that this 
area of law is undergoing significant development. 
 104 Id. at 237–41. 
 105 Id. at 237–38, 251–52. 
 106 Id. at 239–42. 
 107 Id. at 237. 
 108 Id. at 238. 
 109 Id. at 241–43; Solove & Hartzog, supra note 101, at 598–99. 
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assert that the entity was committing unfair acts by subjecting consumers to 
nonexistent or dubious data privacy and security procedures that exploit 
consumers in a way competitors are unwilling to match.110 In other words, 
exploitation of consumers provides an unfair advantage over competitors 
who have a conscience. 
The FTC has brought a large number of actions under the deceptiveness 
prong against entities that do not follow their own data protection policies.111 
Furthermore, courts have endorsed the FTC’s authority to bring this kind of 
action.112 However, actions under the unfairness prong have less precedential 
support because fewer have been brought and most have settled.113 
Nonetheless, the FTC’s authority to bring actions under the unfairness prong 
for inadequate data privacy and security procedures has been specifically 
endorsed by the Third Circuit in F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. and 
has not been rejected by any court.114 Though often calling for 
comprehensive legislation on data privacy and security, the FTC has, in the 
absence of such legislation, taken up the mantle of data privacy and security 
enforcer by pursuing entities with no standards, insufficient standards, or 
standards they fail to meet.115 Thus, the FTC is by default the closest thing to 
a general data privacy and security regulator. As such, one would expect that 
the FTC should have a role in pursuing improved wireless account security 
measures to prevent SIM-swap attacks. 
However, the FTC may have limited ability to regulate wireless 
providers.116 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit recently held in its en banc 
decision, regarding wireless provider AT&T, that the FTC can only bring 
actions against common carriers under section 5 of the FTC Act for their 
 
 110 Pardau & Edwards, supra note 100, at 229. 
 111 Id. at 239–41; Solove & Hartzog, supra note 101, at 598–99. 
 112 Pardau & Edwards, supra note 100, at 239–41. 
 113 Id. at 239–43. 
 114 799 F.3d 236, 247–49 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding that the FTC had authority to bring suit under the 
unfairness prong of Section 5). But see LabMD, Inc. v. F.T.C., 678 F. App’x 816, 817, 819–21 (11th Cir. 
2016) (granting a stay for appeal to the Eleventh Circuit because LabMD made “a strong showing” that 
the FTC’s interpretation of the injury requirement under section 5 of the FTCA is unreasonable). 
However, the Eleventh Circuit on appeal assumed that the FTC’s interpretation of the unfairness was 
proper but found that the resulting cease and desist was too ambiguous to be enforceable. LabMD, Inc. 
v. F.T.C., 894 F.3d 1221, 1231, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2018). A holding in LabMD’s favor on interpretation 
of the unfairness prong would have limited the FTC’s effective regulatory power to enforcement actions 
having more than a significant risk of causing tangible harms. See Pardau & Edwards, supra note 100, at 
262–63. 
 115 Pardau & Edwards, supra note 100, at 239–42. 
 116 Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 
1428–29 (2017); Simpson, supra note 31, at 692–96. 
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non-common carrier activities.117 This matter is not fully settled as the 
designation of wireless providers as common carriers for certain services is 
still fluid.118 In view of these developments, the FTC’s authority to bring 
enforcement actions against wireless providers for insufficient security 
leading to SIM-swap attacks remains uncertain. Wireless account access, 
with its close relation to the provision of mobile voice, a common carrier 
service, very possibly still qualifies for the common carrier exception to the 
FTC’s authority even under the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the exception is 
activity-based and not status-based.119 Thus, although the FTC has a 
substantial role in general data security and privacy, there is strong doubt as 
to the FTC’s regulatory authority to enforce data privacy and security 
standards against wireless providers’ provision of common carrier services. 
But, even assuming the FTC does have authority to bring actions 
against wireless providers for SIM-swap attacks, such actions would not 
provide any direct benefit to SIM-swap victims. In other words, the FTC’s 
authority to sue wireless providers does little to provide recovery of damages 
for SIM-swap victims. Thus, the so-called default cybersecurity agency is in 
a position where it may have no ability to bring actions based on SIM-swap 
attacks and, even if it does have authority such actions will do little to make 
SIM-swap victims whole. Certainly, the FTC should get involved to solve 
the problem of SIM-swap attacks, but any comprehensive solution that 
addresses the injuries suffered by SIM-swap victims must go beyond FTC 
action. 
B. Tort common law assigns liability to wireless providers for negligence, 
which protects consumers now and provides relief for SIM-swap victims 
Wireless providers should be subject to liability for SIM-swap attacks 
according to a negligence standard. As both the least cost avoider and the 
most competent harm avoider, wireless providers are in a unique position to 
address the risks of SIM-swap attacks. Tort law and the negligence standard 
are properly situated to place the liability on wireless providers. Although 
other routes to address SIM-swap attacks exist, including FCC or FTC action 
and rulemaking, these mechanisms are slow to respond to consumer harms 
and provide uncertain recourse for SIM-swap victims. In contrast, civil 
negligence liability is available now and provides clear recourse for SIM-
 
 117 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 883 F.3d 848, 863–64 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc); 
see also Simpson, supra note 31, at 692–96. 
 118 See AT&T Mobility, 883 F.3d at 864. 
 119 Id. at 863. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
102 
swap victims.120 Further, a reasonable standard of care for cybersecurity 
provides a fluid standard that can change with the development of new 
threats and new technology standards. Courts should find wireless providers 
liable for injuries arising from SIM-swap attacks under the reasonable 
standard of care. This section leans on case law from the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for support and substantially distinguishes contrary holdings before 
developing the argument that negligence with a reasonableness standard is 
the most elegant solution for SIM-swap attacks. 
Although case law regarding wireless provider liability for SIM-swap 
attacks is lacking, inferences can be drawn from negligence claims brought 
for alleged insufficient data security. These inferences strongly support a 
negligence claim against wireless providers for SIM-swap attacks based on 
the presence of tangible, nonspeculative harm, which starkly distinguishes 
SIM-swap attacks from cases where courts have held against finding liability 
for negligence due to the absence of such harm. 
Specifically, SIM-swap attacks involving theft of cryptocurrency assets 
are distinguishable from many failed negligence claims because such SIM-
swap attacks include tangible assets that establish clear harm. For example, 
due to the absence of harm, the court in Ruiz v. Gap, Inc. upheld summary 
judgement, rejecting a negligence claim arising from theft of personal 
information on a computer.121 According to the court, theft of this personal 
information “failed to establish sufficient appreciable, nonspeculative, 
present harm.”122 Thus, unlike the absence of nonspeculative, present harm 
in Ruiz, SIM-swap victims can identify cryptocurrency assets with 
substantial and easily determinable value.123 
Indeed, courts often focus on the presence or absence of tangible 
damages in negligence claims, an issue strongly supporting recovery for 
SIM-swap victims who have suffered theft of millions of dollars. 
Specifically, the court in Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co. held that 
mitigation costs incurred responding to increased threat of fraud qualified as 
reasonably foreseeable and cognizable injury.124 In that case, the negligence 
claim flowed from the theft of defendant grocery store’s electronic customer 
 
 120 Two lawsuits filed against wireless providers by SIM-swap victims allege negligence, among 
other things. Terpin Complaint, supra note 24, ¶¶ 183-91; Tapang Complaint, supra note 24, ¶¶ 7.1-7.4. 
 121 380 F. App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. Some negligence claims have been barred against financial institutions due to specific 
regulations. See, e.g., Patco Const. Co. v. People’s United Bank, 684 F.3d 197, 199, 216 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(affirming dismissal of the negligence claim for fraudulent fund transfer because the bank’s duty of care 
was displaced by Article 4A of the UCC, which governs funds transfers). 
 124 659 F.3d 151, 154, 164–65, 167 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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payment information.125 The court reversed dismissal of the negligence 
claim.126 Cryptocurrency assets stolen from SIM-swap victims, which have 
an easily determinable U.S. dollar value, are even more cognizable than the 
mitigation costs supporting the negligence claim in Anderson.127 
As another example of a negligence claim supported by financial injury, 
the court in Resnick v. AvMed, Inc. held that a negligence claim was 
supported by monetary losses due to fraudulent charges.128 The court 
reversed dismissal of the negligence claim that flowed from defendant’s 
alleged negligence in securing computer hardware that held personal 
customer information.129 Just as the financial injury of monetary losses in 
Resnick supported a negligence claim for victims of personal information 
theft, the financial injury of lost cryptocurrency assets having real and clear 
monetary value supports a negligence claim for SIM-swap victims.130 
Further, SIM-swap victims suffer from determinable damages that are 
not boundless, and these damages serve to identify a limited class of victims. 
In Lone Star National Bank, N.A. v. Heartland Payment Systems, Inc., the 
court upheld the negligence claim based on the identifiability of the injured 
class and the absence of boundless liability due to the determinability of the 
damages.131 The plaintiff met the requirement of “an identifiable class that 
the defendant should have reasonably foreseen was likely to be injured by 
the defendant’s conduct,” and the fraudulent charges and credit card 
replacement costs did not impart “boundless liability.”132 Thus, the court held 
the economic loss doctrine did not bar the negligence claim against the credit 
card processor for data breach.133 
Thus, the clearly determinable and tangible damages along with the 
easily identifiable class of injured victims in SIM-swap attacks support 
negligence claims against wireless providers as illustrated by this brief 
survey of cases from U.S. Courts of Appeals. Even more, however, 
negligence provides a more elegant solution to SIM-swap attack than federal 
action. Negligence is the right solution because it is available to victims now, 
it is fluid enough to apply to the rapidly changing environment of 
cybersecurity threats, and it provides remedy to victims of SIM-swap attacks 
instead of promises of improvement in the future. 
 
 125 Id. at 154. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 164–65, 167. 
 128 693 F.3d 1317, 1324, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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 131 729 F.3d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 132 Id. (citation omitted). 
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First, although the FCC and the FTC may promote progress reducing 
SIM-swap attacks by successful rulemaking or enforcement actions, such 
steps are slow to implement and do little for the victims who have already 
lost millions of dollars. Negligence is a ready standard currently available to 
victims of SIM-swap attack, and it can accomplish the same goal of reducing 
SIM-swap attacks.134 Second, negligence according to a reasonableness 
standard is also fluid enough to apply to the rapidly changing environment 
of cybersecurity threats. As threats develop, wireless providers should be 
held to a standard of reasonable security measures. Thus, as threats change 
and rapidly develop, the efforts that wireless providers take to ensure security 
can be judged for reasonableness against the changes and timing that occur 
in the industry.135 Third, negligence also provides remedy to victims of SIM-
swap attacks. Unlike FCC rulemaking, FTC action, or legislative reaction, 
negligence provides a way to make present victims whole. Such a fair 
treatment of the victims also furthers the public policy goal of consumer 
protection. By providing remedy to those harmed and placing the liability on 
wireless providers, negligence claims would change wireless provider 
behavior to avoid liability by exercising proper care during phone number 
transfers. 
Assigning negligence liability under a reasonableness standard to 
wireless providers would help victims now, fluidly adapt to the changing 
threat landscape in the future, and provide remedy to victims while furthering 
consumer protection. 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION: TORT LAW IS AN 
ELEGANT SOLUTION FOR THE PRESENT; THE FTC AND FCC 
MIGHT HELP IN THE FUTURE 
Wireless providers should be held to a reasonableness standard of 
negligence liability for SIM-swap attacks on wireless consumers. The 
current legal landscape provides uncertainty without a clear path forward for 
victims. Negligence liability provides that clear path today if courts will 
apply it. There are strong arguments for involvement by the FTC, as the 
default cybersecurity regulator, and the FCC, as the explicit 
telecommunications regulator, but such agency involvement will be too slow 
to prevent and remedy the harms occurring now and is accompanied by 
 
 134 The FCC certainly should undertake rulemaking to clarify the requirements placed on wireless 
providers by 47 U.S.C. § 222, but such rulemaking should complement common law negligence claims 
by clarifying that the duty or care is set by a reasonableness standard and by explicitly assigning damages 
for SIM-swap attacks to wireless providers. 
 135 A strict liability standard would not provide the same flexibility and may reduce consumer 
consumption of wireless services. 
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significant uncertainty. Tort law can provide the solution to SIM-swap 
attacks now by making wireless providers liable to SIM-swap victims for 
unreasonable security. Such liability will encourage the hoped-for 
improvements in wireless provider security. The FCC, FTC, and the federal 
legislature can and probably should help, but the problem might be solved 
before they get to it. 
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